Mao Zedong was an important political figure, military strategist, and theorist in 20th-century China. He was also one of the founding members of the Communist Party of China. He led the Communist Party to victory, establishing the People’s Republic of China and serving as its first chairman.
Both Mao Zedong and Sun Tzu were outstanding strategic thinkers in the realm of warfare and military affairs, albeit in different historical contexts. Through Mao Zedong’s writings in ‘Selected Works of Mao Zedong,’ it is evident that he had deeply studied and learned from Sun Tzu’s ‘The Art of War.’ Mao referenced Sun Tzu and his philosophy in several of his articles, integrating the wisdom of ‘The Art of War’ into his revolutionary practices and leadership strategies.
In this article, we have compiled seven sections from ‘Selected Works of Mao Zedong’ that are related to Sun Tzu. Through Mao Zedong’s understanding and application of ‘The Art of War,’ we not only glimpse the convergence of the thoughts of these two great figures but also derive eternal truths about warfare and leadership.
1.Strategic Planning and Decision Making
Mao Zedong put forward the following views in his article “Strategic Issues in China’s Revolutionary War”:
The correct deployment of a commander originates from a sound determination, which, in turn, stems from accurate judgment. Accurate judgment is based on thorough and necessary reconnaissance, and the coherent synthesis of various reconnaissance materials. Commanders utilize all possible and necessary means of reconnaissance, meticulously analyzing the gathered enemy intelligence to separate the vital from the trivial, discern the truth from deception, contemplate from various angles, and then incorporate their own side’s situation. Through this, they study the comparison between both sides and their mutual relations, thus forming judgments, making determinations, and devising plans. This process encapsulates the entire understanding of a military strategist before formulating any strategic, campaign, or battle plan.
Careless military strategists neglect this process, basing their plans on wishful thinking, rendering such plans impractical and divorced from reality. Rash military leaders, driven solely by passion, fall prey to enemy deception, lured by superficial or one-sided enemy circumstances or misled by irresponsible advice from their subordinates lacking genuine insight. Consequently, they inevitably face setbacks due to their ignorance or unwillingness to base military plans on the foundation of meticulous analysis of necessary reconnaissance and the interplay of the enemy and friendly situations.
The process of understanding does not merely exist before the establishment of military plans but also persists after their formulation. When executing a particular plan, from its initiation to the conclusion of the battle, it constitutes another process of understanding—the process of implementation. At this juncture, the elements from the initial process must be re-examined for their alignment with the actual situation. If the plan deviates or incompletely aligns with the circumstances, it becomes imperative to form new judgments, make new determinations based on this new understanding, and modify the established plan to suit the updated situation. Nearly every military operation involves some partial modifications, while occasional circumstances warrant complete overhauls. Foolhardy individuals either fail to recognize the necessity for changes or resist them, persisting blindly, and ultimately encountering insurmountable obstacles.
How does Sun Tzu put it?
When considering the correlation between ‘The Art of War’ and Mao Zedong’s discussions on military decision-making and strategic planning, similarities emerge.
‘The Art of War’ similarly emphasizes the importance of understanding, planning, and decision-making in warfare, including comprehensive analysis of the situations of both enemies and allies and meticulous contemplation to formulate adaptable combat plans. These themes are predominantly concentrated in the first chapter of ‘The Art of War,’ the ‘Laying Plans‘.
2.Exploiting Enemy Mistakes and Creating Deception
Mao Zedong put forward the following views in his article “Strategic Issues in China’s Revolutionary War”:
Enemies make mistakes just as we occasionally err, providing opportunities for exploitation. Furthermore, we can deliberately induce errors in the enemy’s actions. For instance, Sun Tzu’s concept of ‘shì xíng’ (示形) or ‘showing one thing while doing another’ (i.e., deceiving the enemy by creating a false appearance).
‘Shì xíng’ (示形) refers to Sun Tzu’s ‘LAYING PLANS‘ in ‘The Art of War,’ where he states, ‘All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.‘ This phrase is widely circulated and quoted.
The art of war’s concept of ‘shì xíng’ encapsulates the essence of employing deception as a strategic tactic in warfare, advocating the use of various deceptive techniques to mislead and confuse the enemy. This strategy involves presenting a false appearance or intention to lure the enemy into making errors or misjudgments.
3.Know your enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster
Mao Zedong put forward the following views in his article “Strategic Issues in China’s Revolutionary War”:
There are those who are knowledgeable about themselves but ignorant about their adversaries, and conversely, there are those who understand their adversaries but lack understanding about themselves. Neither can effectively grasp the study and application of the laws of warfare. The ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Wu’s statement in ‘The Art of War,’ ‘Know your enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster,’ encompasses both the stages of learning and application. It involves understanding the development patterns within the objective reality and acting accordingly, overcoming current adversaries based on these patterns. Let’s not underestimate the significance of this statement.
Mao Zedong put forward the following views in his article “On Contradiction“:
The art of war emphasizes understanding both sides engaged in warfare. Wei Zheng, a person from the Tang Dynasty, once said, ‘Listen to all and you will be enlightened; trust only a part, and you will be in the dark,’ understanding the pitfalls of partiality. However, many of our comrades tend to view issues with partiality, often leading to setbacks. In ‘Water Margin,’ during Song Jiang’s three attacks on Zhu Family Village, they initially faced defeats twice due to a lack of understanding of the situation and incorrect methods. Later, by altering their approach and starting with an investigation of the circumstances, they became familiar with the terrain, disrupted the alliance between Li, Hu, and Zhu Family Villages, and arranged ambush troops within the enemy’s camp. They employed a tactic similar to the ‘Trojan Horse’ in foreign tales, leading to victory in the third battle. ‘Water Margin’ contains numerous instances of dialectical materialism, and this ‘Three Attacks on Zhu Family Village’ stands out as one of the best.
Mao Zedong put forward the following views in his article “On Protracted War“:
We acknowledge that the phenomenon of war is more elusive and less certain compared to any other social phenomenon, often bearing what is called ‘contingency.’ However, war is not divine but rather an inevitable worldly activity. Thus, Sun Tzu’s principle, ‘Know your enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster,’ remains a scientific truth.
Mao Zedong quoted ‘Know your enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster’ three times, showcasing his profound appreciation for this phrase. In fact, this was Mao Zedong’s favorite quote.
This statement is well-known; even those who haven’t read ‘The Art of War’ are likely familiar with it. It originates from Chapter Three, ‘ATTACK BY STRATAGEM,’ in Sun Tzu’s ‘The Art of War.
4.Avoid the enemy’s sharpness, strike at their weakness
Mao Zedong put forward the following views in his article “Strategic Issues in China’s Revolutionary War”:
During the Jiangxi campaign against the third ‘Encirclement and Suppression’ by the opposition forces, the Red Army executed an extreme form of retreat by concentrating in the rear areas of their base. This unconventional strategy was necessary as the enemy forces outnumbered the Red Army by more than tenfold. Sun Tzu’s statement ‘Avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return.’ was aimed at exhausting and demoralizing the enemy, seeking to diminish their overwhelming advantage.
‘Avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return.‘ is a principle of war strategy found in Chapter Seven, ‘MANEUVERING,’ in Sun Tzu’s ‘The Art of War.’ It suggests steering clear of confronting the enemy’s strength directly and instead choosing to strike when the enemy is lax, lazy, or unprepared, seizing their weaknesses or vulnerabilities for attack.
This principle emphasizes the flexibility and finesse in war strategy, advocating not necessarily confronting the enemy’s strengths head-on but capitalizing on their unpreparedness, negligence, or vulnerabilities to achieve victory. Such strategic thinking often involves avoiding direct confrontation with a formidable enemy while pinpointing their weaknesses to launch attacks, thereby achieving more effective strategic goals.
5.All warfare is based on deception
Mao Zedong put forward the following views in his article “On Protracted War”:
Deception is a critical element in warfare, as illusions and surprises can lead to the loss of advantage and initiative. Therefore, deliberately creating the enemy’s misperceptions and launching unexpected attacks is a method to gain superiority and seize initiative—an essential approach. What is deception? ‘On Ba-Gong Mountain, every bush and tree appears as an army’ is an example of deception. ‘Create sound in the east, strike in the west’ is one method to deceive the enemy. When conditions favor blocking information in superior civilian situations, various methods of deceiving the enemy often effectively trap them in erroneous judgments and actions, leading to the loss of their advantage and initiative. ‘Deception is an indispensable part of warfare’ refers to this.
······ We are not Duke Xiang of Song, so let’s avoid that foolishly moralistic attitude of a dumb pig.
Sun Tzu mentions ‘deception’ twice in ‘The Art of War’: first in Chapter One, ‘Laying Plans,’ where he states, ‘All warfare is based on deception,’ and secondly in Chapter Seven, ‘Maneuvering,’ In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed.’
This principle is a classic in ‘The Art of War,’ emphasizing the reasonable and necessary use of strategy, schemes, and cunning in warfare. It underscores the importance of employing various means to achieve victory in war.
This doesn’t advocate for dishonesty or deceit but acknowledges that in the context of war, using various strategies, tactics, and sometimes even illusions or falsehoods may be necessary to gain an advantage or secure victory. In warfare, adversaries also employ tactics to confuse, deceive, or even defeat each other. Therefore, to safeguard oneself, deceive the enemy, or create advantageous circumstances in war, resorting to indirect means at times reflects strategic acumen and wisdom.
6.To take the indirect route for a direct path
To defend in order to attack, to retreat in order to advance, to move sideways in order to move forward, and to take the indirect route for a direct path—these are inevitable phenomena in the development of many things, let alone in military operations.
This phrase is from ‘On the Struggle in the Strategy of the Chinese Revolutionary War.‘ It signifies that when dealing with complex situations and aiming to achieve objectives, at times, it’s necessary to adopt flexible, unconventional methods and strategies. Sometimes, sacrificing immediate directness may ultimately serve a larger strategic goal.
At times, defensive measures are crucial before launching an offensive to protect one’s position or resources. Sometimes, in order to advance effectively, temporary retreats or strategic adjustments are needed to secure a more advantageous position or timing. Occasionally, to counter a frontal threat from the enemy, action may need to come from a lateral or alternative angle. Even in seeking a direct path, there might be times when taking an indirect route is necessary to bypass obstacles or avoid risks.
Similar sentiments are expressed in Chapter Seven, ‘MANEUVERING,’ of ‘The Art of War’ by Sun Tzu, where he mentions ‘The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.’
7.Swift Decision and Endurance
Mao Zedong put forward the following views in his article “Strategic Issues in China’s Revolutionary War”:
Due to the robustness of reactionary forces, the growth of revolutionary forces is gradual, which determines the endurance of war…
The principles of campaigns and battles, however, contrast this by emphasizing not endurance but swift decision-making. Seeking swift resolutions in campaigns and battles is a commonality throughout history and across nations. Concerning warfare, universally, a speedy resolution is always sought, as prolonged conflicts are generally considered unfavorable. However, uniquely in China, wars must be handled with the utmost endurance, and waged as protracted struggles.
When facing invaders, the invaded country or region typically adopts a strategy of strategic defense. This defensive strategy is in response to the invader’s tendency to seek a rapid resolution, aiming to swiftly occupy territory and neutralize opponents. Therefore, the defending side often resorts to tactics of delay and endurance to resist aggression.
In historical instances, such as China facing invasions from northern nomadic tribes, Russia opposing Napoleon’s invasion, the Soviet Union countering Hitler’s Germany, and China resisting Japanese aggression, the invaded countries often opted for strategic defense. This was due to the lack of resources in manpower and materials, leading them to choose a defensive stance to prolong the war, exhausting the enemy’s strength and willpower, or to buy time, awaiting favorable circumstances.
However, while the overall strategy emphasizes defense, in the context of campaigns and battles, all parties involved in the war seek swift victories. This is because, in specific battles, both the attacking and defending sides desire a prompt conclusion to achieve victory.
As mentioned in Chapter Two, ‘Waging War,’ of ‘The Art of War’ by Sun Tzu: ‘ In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.‘
Mao Zedong’s study of Sun Tzu’s Art of War not only represents the inheritance and evolution of military thought but also embodies the application and continuation of traditional Chinese wisdom. These insights hold universal applicability in warfare and leadership, offering valuable insights into understanding the essence of war and navigating complex situations.